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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
REMINGTON-RAND, INC., a corporation,
Respondent and Plaintiff,
VS.

THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S.
MACHADO, fdba A - Typewriter
Company,

Defendants,

No. 8379

vs.
DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a
corporation,
Appellants and Garnishee Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

FACTS OF THE CASE
On January 24, 1955, Remington-Rand, Inc. was awarded
a Judgment by Default against defendant Thurman E. O'Neil
in Case No. 10403·8 in the Third District Court of Salt Lake
Cou_nty, State of Utah, in the sum of $4,243.82, and costs,
for merchandise theretofore delivered to Thurman E. O'Neil
3
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while operating a business known as A-1 Typewriter Company at Provo, Utah (R. 19).
Thereafter, on March 18, 1955, two separate garnishments
were served upon appellants, Dale E. Grant and Utah Cash
Register Exchange, Inc. requesting them to make regular
answers concerning any indebtedness, etc. between O'Neil
and appellants (R. 11, 13).
Thereupon, Dale E. Grant made negative answers on all
questions and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. admitted
that it had certain property in its possession, consisting of
work benches, a compressor and miscellaneous tools and
equipment (R. 16) which it understood belonged to O'Neil,
but upon which E. F. White (one of plaintiff's witnesses hereinafter referred to) had a security interest under a Bill of
Sale from O'Neil.
Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. was a small corporation which was located at 141 East 2nd South Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, and was engaged in the business of selling and
servicing cash register machines and similar allied office equipment. Dale E. Grant was its principal stockholder and was
also president of the corporation.
About ten (10) days after sending the Answers to Garnishment to plaintiffs, a single instrument entitled "Notice"
was received by app~llants, stating that on April 18, 1955,
(thirteen days thereafter) that (R. 21)..... plaintiff will call up in the Law and Motion
Division of the above-entitled Court, a hearing to determine the indebtedness, if any, due Thurman E.
O'Neil by the garnishees above."

4
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On April 16, 1955, appellant Dale E. Grant was served
with a subpoena to appear on April 18 as a witness on the
part of the plaintiff and was paid a $6.20 witness fee. In
obedience therewith he appeared, accompanied by counsel, and
listened to and participated in a hearing which, at its conclusion, resulted in a personal judgment against both Utah Cash
Register Exchange, Inc., and himself for $3,600.00 and costs.
Although appellants have to this time been unable to
ascertain what happened, it appears as if plaintiff proceeded at
the hearing on the basis of a "Reply to Answers of Garnishees"
which was filed in the proceedings, but which was never
served on appellants. However, a "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" was actually served on T. E. O'Neil on or about
April 5, 1955, at the same time the "Notice" was received
by these appellants.
A search of the record (R. 34-35) does not indicate service
of the "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" upon anyone. Although appellants knew that O'Neil had received such an
instrument, its exact contents were not known to them prior
to the hearing.
A.t the "hearing", the plaintiff put on evidence and Dale
E. Grant took the stand and testified in accordance with the
appellants' answers to garnishments. At its conclusion the
Court announced its decision and promptly arose and left
the Courtroom while appellants, dumbfounded, wondered what
had happened.
The first Garnishee Judgment was against Dale E. Grant
alone (R. 17-18). Later this judgment was set aside as un-

5
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supported by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
required by Rule 64 D (h) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
a new "Amended Judgment" was entered against both Dale
E. ~nt and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., nunc pro tunc
(R. 1). The Findings of Fact (R. 5-6) purporting to support
the "Amended Judgment" were later amended upon motion of
appellants.
NATURE OF TI-lE CASE
The matter before this Court primarily involves procedural due process under the Constitutions of the State of
Utah and the United States. There is no question but what a
"hearing" was had in the matter, but whether the "Notice"
which was given was sufficient to satisfy due process of law
is what this Court must decide. Also, the questions of whether
appellants were accorded a fair opportunity to demand a trial
by jury and to take advantage of the various defensive pretrial preparation procedures provided by our Rules of Civil
Procedure are present in this appeal.
A further point is presented by the proceedings, namely:
Did the District Court have jurisdiction to grant plaintiff any
judgment exceeding that provided by Rule 64 D ( i) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which basically provides that upon
failure of the plaintiff to reply, judgment shall be entered consistent with the answers of the garnishee.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellants submit the following points as reasons for seeking a reversal of the judgment of the lower court:

6
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(1)
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A TRIAL
BY JURY, OR A FAIR TRIAL WITHOUT A JURY, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT SERVED WITH NOTICE, AS
REQUIRED BY RULE 64 D(h), URCP, THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS PROCEEDING AT THE HEARING HELD APRIL
18, 1955, ON THE THEORY AND ALLEGATIONS OF
ITS "REPLY TO ANSWERS TO GARNISHEES" WHICH
WAS NEVER SERVED ON APPELLANTS.

(II)
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO MAKE AND ENTER ANY JUDGMENT EXCEEDING THAT ALLOWABLE UNDER THE ANSWERS
OF THESE DEFENDANTS TO THE GARNISHMENTS
SERVED UPON THEM, AND AS PROVIDED FOR BY
RULE 64 D(i), URCP.

(III)
NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, AND THAT DALE E. GRANT
SHOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE JUDGMENT
WHICH WAS ENTERED IN THE GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS.
7
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ARGUMENT

(1)
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A TRIAL
BY JURY, OR A FAIR TRIAL WITHOUT A JURY, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT SERVED WITH NOTICE, AS
REQUIRED BY RULE 64 D(h), URCP, THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS PROCEEDING AT THE HEARING HELD APRIL
18, 1955, ON THE THEORY AND ALLEGATIONS OF
ITS "REPLY TO ANSWERS TO GARNISHEES" WHICH
WAS NEVER SERVED ON APPELLANTS.
When appellants received the April 5th notice of the
hearing to be held less than two weeks later, O'Neil also received such a notice, together with the "Reply to Answers
of Garnishees." Being unaware of the contents of the papers
served on O'Neil or what role O'Neil was to play, appellant
Dale E. Grant went to the "hearing" on April 18, 1955, with
his attorney. When objections to the procedure were raised,
he stated in his affidavit (R. 26) that he would not have had
any particular reason to personally attend the hearing except
to clarify any questions arising out of his Answers to Garnishments (R. 26) :
"Your affiant further represents that he has never
had any objection to plaintiff recovering from him,
pursuant to a court Order, those items of personal property belonging to defendant O'Neil which your affiant
had in his custody as President of Utah Cash Register
Exchange, Inc., and that he appeared in Court for
the primary purpose of so informing the Court of the
same; that he was Subpoened to appear in Court by
8
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the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, and was paid
the regular witness fee of $6.20; that the documents
submitted on his behalf as exhibits in said hearing were
ordered to be brought to Court by your affiant pursuant
to the subpoena served upon him by the plaintiff in
said action; that he did not appear in Court-either
through himself or his counsel-prepared or informed
that any attempt would be made to charge him personally with any purported or alleged debts due to
Thurman E. O'Neil as an alter ego of Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc."
That Grant appeared and so testified is evidenced from
his testimony at the hearing (R. 76):
Q. Is it satisfactory with you if Remington-Rand takes
possession through the sheriff and sells some of that
equipment?

A. Absolutely, it is all right.
Q. Could you tell the Court what equipment is on the
premises ·to which you claim no interest that belongs to Mr. O'Neil or to him and others?
A. I think I can tell most of it as I remember that.
There was the compressor, air compressor, a vat of
cleaning-or vat machine, some parts cabinets with
parts and some Cole cabinets, file cabinets, file,
desk; there were two used machines they sent. There
was a question of who owned one between T. E.
O'Neil and E. F. White. They were on E. F. White's
Bill of Sale.
Q. And as to these items, you claim no interest?
A. No interest whatsoever.
Q. And are those the items to which you made reference in the answers to the garnishment served upon
you?
A. Yes.

9
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At the conclusion of the hearing the Judge announced
that Dale E. Grant was indebted to O'Neil in the sum of
$3,600.00, and that judgment would issue binding Dale E.
Grant personally, because Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc.
was his alter ego. The Judge then forthwith arose from the
bench and proceeded to chambers without entertaining any
further comment. It was only afterwards when appellant and
his counsel examined the file that it became fully clear that
the appellants had been submitted to an actual trial on the
rrReply to Answers to Garnishment" which had never been
served on them!
A further inspection of the file revealed that the evidence
introduced did not even follow the theory of the "Reply to
Answers of Garnishees" in that-

( 1) The Reply stated (R. 34) that the sum of $3,600.00
was asserted therein as a transfer of a stock of merchandise,
apparently in violation of the Bulk Sales Act; whereas the controverted evidence submitted by witnesses for the plaintiff
was clearly to the effect that O'Neil purp,<?rtedly loaned money
to Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., after its incorporation
(R. 49), that title to none of O'Neil's goods were transferred
to Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., and that plaintiff's witness E. L. White actually held a Bill of Sale to the merchandise
appellants actually did have in their possession.

Q. Now, Mr. Snyder, you show here the figure
$3,020.00 as owed to Mr. O'Neil. What does that
represent?
A. That represents the money that O'Neil gave Mr.
Grant to pay off a certain mortgage, chattel mortgage at Farmers State Bank.
10
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Similar and further testimony can be found on pages 45, 46,
47 and 60.

( 2) In the "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" it was asserted that O'Neil was a fifty percent "partner" in the business
with Grant (R. 34), whereas Snyder testified quite to the contrary on behalf of the plaintiff (R. 53) :
Q. And then am I correct in assuming that this was
simply a matter of how much money was owed
to you and O'Neil by Utah Cash Register?
A. And others.
Q. And others. Am I correct in that?
A. That's correct.

Q. And it did not involve an ownership arrangement
then?
A. Only to the point of the merchandise involved.
Q. But by that I mean there was nothing discussed as
to whether you or O'Neil owned part of the Utah
Cash Register Exchange as a result of that, was
there?
A. Nothing was discussed other than what transpired
earlier.
( 3) The "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" contended
that Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. was the alter ego of
appellant Dale E. Grant (R. 34), organized for the purpose
of defrauding creditors of O'Neil; however, Snyder again on
behalf of plaintiff, testified as follows (R. 46):

Q. Were you present at conversations between Mr.
Grant and his attorney preceding the incorporation
of Utah Cash Register?
11
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A. Yes.

Q. And did Mr. Grant on that occasion state the reason
for the incorporation of Utah Cash Register?
A. Well, I presume limited liability is the understanding that I had out of the conversation.
Further, the money allegedly loaned to Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., was claimed to have been secured by sales
of merchandise by O'Neil and Snyder long after incorporation

(R. 55).
Appellant has as yet been unable to satisfactorily determine under what theory, basis or ground plaintiff was proceeding in the hearing.
There is no need to cite cases concerning the requirements
of procedural due process of law under Section 7 of Article I
of the Constitution of the State of Utah or under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Due process of law contemplates notice and an opportunity
to be heard. True, an opportunity was had for a hearing in the
matter before the Court, and an instrument purporting to be
a "Notice" was given. But it is submitted that the "Notice"
contained nothing sufficient to inform appellants of the true
nature of the proceedings brought before the Court. If anything, the "Notice" served to mislead appellants as to the
nature of the relief being sought. Certainly, there was nothing
in the "Notice" to inform appellants, partic~larly appellant
Dale E. Grant, that an attempt would be made to hold him
personally liable on the ground that the corporation was his
alter ego.

12
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Appellants believe that the record so clearly shows a complete failure of giving reasonable notice that the need for
quoting extensive authority is considered wholly unnecessary.
Another interesting observation to be made concerning
the entire proceeding is that Section 64 D (h) of our U tab Rules
of Civil Procedure specifically affords a jury trial in such
actions.

(h) Reply to Answer of Garnishee; Trial of Issues;
Judgment.
" ... the matter thus at issue shall be tried in the
same manner as other issues of like nature. Judgment
shall be entered upon the verdict or finding the same
as if the garnishee had answered according to such
verdict or finding. Costs shall be awarded in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 54( d)."
Appellants submit that the form and substance of the
"Notice"-besides having the matter set in the Law and Motion Division of the Third District Court within thirteen
( 13) days-deprived them of the kind of notice that would
have reasonably informed them that they might demand a jury
trial and that they should ·utilize the various remedies afforded
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procudure for depositions, interrogatories and other pre-trial discovery techniques. See annotation in 88 ALR beginning at page 1148.
It is submitted that garnishment hearings, particularly if
the garnishee demands the same, should be set on the trial
calendar and not heard in the Law and Motion Division of the

Court.

13
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(II)
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO MAKE AND ENTER ANY JUDGMENT EXCEEDING THAT ALLOWABLE UNDER THE ANSWERS
OF THESE DEFENDANTS TO THE GARNISHMENTS
SERVED UPON THEM, AND AS PROVIDED FOR BY
RULE 64 D(i), URCP.
Rule 64 D (h) further provides as follows:
" . . . if the garnishee answers, the plaintiff may,
within 10 days after the expiration of the time allowed
for the filing of such answer, serve upon the garnishee
and file a reply to the whole or any part thereof; and
may also allege any matters which would charge the
garnishee with liability . . . "
It is submitted that the failure of plaintiff to serve the
Reply upon the garnishees is jurisdictional, and that because
of plaintiff's failure the Court had no jurisdiction to make and
enter judgment in the absence· of a clear showing that appellants were fully informed of the proceedings, nor did it have
jurisdiction over the subject matter upon which it passed judgment. It can hardly be argued that the Court should hear a
matter involving a Reply to Answers of Garnishees when in
fact one of the garnishees appeared pursuant to Subpoena and
for purposes consistent with Rule 64 (D) (i), URCP.
Appellant appeared pursuant to subpoena
purpose of informing the Court that Utah Cash
change, Inc. had no objection to the plaintiff's
equipment from its premises as was owned by

and for the
Register Extaking such
O'Neil and

14
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White. He also expected to give whatever information concerning the personal property which was levied upon as was desired of him. His affidavit was clearly to such effect (R. 26).
Appellants could have fully expected judgment to be
entered consistent only with Rule 64 D(i), URCP:
Judgment on Answer to Garnishee.
If the plaintiff fails to reply to the answer of the
garnishee, he shall be deemed to have accepted it as
correct, and judgment may be entered thereon ... In
no event shall the garnishee be chargeable with costs,
except under the provisions of subdivisions (h) and
(j) of this Rule.

(III)
NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, AND THAT DALE E. GRANT
SHOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE JUDGMENT
WHICH WAS ENTERED IN THE GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS.
The plaintiff's irregular method of proceeding at the
hearing is once again drawn into sharp focus when one attempts to determine whether plaintiff was trying to hold appellant Dale E. Grant personally liable simply because Grant
allegedly owed money to O'Neil, or whether plaintiff intended
to hold Dale E. Grant liable on the theory that the corporation
of which he was president and the principal stockholder was
his alter ego.

15
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Appellants submit that nothing can be found in the record
to support any finding or conclusion that Utah Cash Register
Exchange, Inc. was the alter ego of Dale E. Grant. The evidence introduced by plaintiff was entirely to the contrary. Reference to some of the evidence has heretofore been made in
former portions of this brief.
From 1 ALR 611 the basic law is stated:
" ... Ordinarily, corporate existence cannot be disregarded. The exceptions to this rule are few."
Plaintiff's witness Snyder readily admitted (R. 46) that
his conclusion concerning the purpose of forming the corporation, while being present at the time of the discussion,
was that rrlimited liability is the ·understanding that I had out
of the conversation." There is nothing in Snyder's testimony
or in any other portion of the record that slightly or remotely
indicates that the corporation was formed for the purpose
of defrauding creditors of O'Neil or of Grant, or that any
other illegal purpose was present. To secure limited liability
is certainly a proper legal purpose and reason for using the
corporate device for doing business.
The basis upon which judgment was entered seemed to
be that by some manner of dealing-which plaintiff's evidence
did not make clear-Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. became
indebted to O'Neil in the amount of $3,000.00, either because
of a cash contribution which O'Neil was to have made to the
business (R. 45), or a loan to the business of a similar amount
(R. 49). In any event, an inspection of the testimony on
pages 45, 47, and 49 of the record clearly shows that anything

16
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O'Neil may have put into the business was cash which he
personally acquired separate and apart from any dealings with
or on behalf of Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., or Dale
E. Grant, and that the money was derived from sales of his
own merchandise while being assisted by plaintiff's own witnesses Snyder and White.
Since title to no property was actually ever transferred to
the corporation in violation of the Bulk Sales Act, what difference would it make whether Grant or the corporation itself
allegedly owed O'Neil in the absence of a showing of some
sort of a collusive plan at the time of incorporation? Unless
a reason appears, and unless the corporation was initially
Grant's alter ego, why should Grant be held liable for the
corporation's doings? This premise becomes clear when we
consider that the corporation was formed in July (R. 46),
it officially began business on August 1 (R. 47), but the sale
of O'Neil's goods from which money was allegedly loaned
or transferred to Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. arose
from sales which occurred in the latter part of August and
September (R. 55). And as to these sales the record is conclusive that neither Grant nor Utah Cash Register Exchange,
Inc. took any part in the same, yet the Court entered judgment
against both appellants.
An examination of the testimony and the remainder of
the record cannot produce the slightest indication of any evidence tending to support a finding that the corporation was
originally formed as the alter ego for Dale E. Grant to effectuate a transfer of property from O'Neil to the corporation in
violation of the Bulk Sales Act, or to otherwise defraud credi17
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tors or to evade the law in any respect. Nor does anythin1
in the record give the Court any b~sis for making a findin1
that Dale E. Grant was operating individually under the alte
ego of Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. during the tim
of the transactions referred to in the testimony while beinJ
president of the Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc.
To further substantiate the foregoing argument, appellant:
submit that respondent cannot possibly show any form o:
notice sufficient to inform appellant Dale E. Grant that h~
was being brought into Court to answer a charge that th~
corporation of which he was president was his alter ego. I
is believed this point has been sufficiently covered heretofore

CONCLUSION
This Court is squarely confronted with the problem o
deciding whether the Utah Rules of Civil Procudure mea1
what they say, or whether the Court should once again engraf
exceptions upon the mandate of the rules, thus encouragin1
a too prevalent practice among many members of the Bar b
treat Court procedure as some some om a necessary evil t1
be dispensed with by sleight of hand.
The writer wishes it to be understood that the foregoin,
criticism is not leveled at counsel for respondent, particularl
since the failure to serve the "Reply to Answers of Garnishees
on appellants has all of the ear-marl<s of an inter-office cleriG
error. But to charge appellants with the results of the errc
is something which this Court should not lightly dismiss.
18
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Appellants fully recognize that an appellate court could,
even in this case, probably reason itself into a position of holding that upon some approach to the matter due process of
law and other matters raised herein were satisfied to the extent
of granting substantial justice to appellants. But such an approach would necessarily have to assume facts and matters
which might be entirely inaccurate and contrary to the true
situation.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in and of themselves
are designed for liberality. But when they are not followed at
all, or when whatever attempt to follow them is improper
and actually misleads the other side of the litigation, it is time
to draw the line.
It is submitted that the "Amended Judgment" should be
set aside and the decison of the lower Court should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER

Attorney for Appellants

;,z Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah

"Notwithstanding all of our eff0rts to eliminate
technicalities and l·ibE:ral ize procedure, we must
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